The U.S. Space Force depends on data to understand the space domain, command and control satellites, provide resilient communications, detect threats, and deliver capabilities to forces around the world. As those missions become more distributed, AI-enabled, and data-intensive, increasing amounts of sensitive and classified information are being stored on systems operating outside the physical protection of traditional data centers and fixed installations. For the Space Force, protecting that information is a mission requirement, not simply an IT requirement. Every National Security System (NSS) supporting a space mission should prompt a basic question: If this device, ground system, sensor, or platform falls outside U.S. physical or operational control, what happens to the information stored inside it? That is the problem Data-at-Rest (DAR) protection is designed to address.
Data at Rest is information stored on a device rather than actively moving across a network. Telemetry transmitted between a satellite and ground station is data in transit. Once that information is saved to an SSD, mission computer, server, or other storage system, it becomes data at rest. Across Space Force missions, DAR can reside on: satellite command-and-control systems; ground stations and ground-control equipment; space-domain awareness systems; deployable and expeditionary space systems; tactical SATCOM equipment; mission-planning workstations; intelligence and ISR systems; tactical and edge-compute servers; sensor-processing systems; ruggedized laptops and operator workstations; maintenance and diagnostic systems; portable and removable storage; and onboard storage within space systems themselves. If a system retains information after power is removed, it potentially contains DAR. And for a space mission, that information may represent far more than what’s visible on an operator’s screen.
A compromised device doesn’t need thousands of classified documents to create a significant intelligence loss. Depending on its mission, stored information could include: Mission information: operational plans, tasking, schedules, orbital information, mission histories, and operational procedures. Space-domain awareness information: tracking information, observations, sensor collections, threat information, and intelligence concerning objects and activities in space. Command-and-control information: configurations, command structures, system parameters, and other information associated with operating space capabilities. Network and communications information: network configurations, addresses, communications parameters, credentials, and information that could help an adversary understand space-related networks and ground infrastructure. Platform information: system logs, configurations, software, firmware, maintenance information, and diagnostic records that may reveal capabilities or vulnerabilities. AI and analytic information: trained models, algorithms, sensor-fusion information, datasets, and software used to detect, characterize, prioritize, or respond to activity in the space domain. Collectively, this information could help an adversary understand what the United States can see, how its space systems operate, how ground and space elements communicate, and potentially where vulnerabilities exist.
Space systems have always generated sensitive information. What’s changing is the amount of computing, storage, and decision-making being distributed across the mission architecture. More Distributed Ground Architectures Resilience increasingly depends upon reducing reliance on a small number of centralized facilities. That means distributing ground infrastructure, processing, communications, and mission capabilities across more locations and systems. Distribution makes the mission harder to disrupt. But it also creates more endpoints containing valuable data that must be protected. More Edge Computing Not every piece of sensor data can, or should, travel to a centralized data center before being processed. Edge computing allows information to be processed closer to sensors, operators, and mission systems, improving speed and resilience when connectivity is constrained. But local processing means local storage. More computing at the edge means more DAR at the edge. Artificial Intelligence The enormous volume of data associated with the space domain makes AI increasingly important for analysis, anomaly detection, sensor fusion, threat characterization, and decision support. Those AI-enabled systems may retain trained models, algorithms, and operational datasets. A compromised endpoint could therefore expose not only mission information, but potentially how the Space Force interprets that information. Increasingly Contested Space Operations Space is no longer an uncontested operating environment. Cyber operations, electronic warfare, counterspace capabilities, and attacks against supporting ground infrastructure all increase the importance of designing systems for operation under adversarial conditions. DAR protection becomes part of that resilience.
When people think about Space Force cybersecurity, it’s natural to focus on satellites. But a space capability is an ecosystem. Satellites depend upon ground stations, command-and-control systems, antennas, processing infrastructure, communications systems, operator workstations, maintenance equipment, and other endpoints. Those systems can contain an extraordinarily detailed picture of the mission. A single operator laptop might contain information relevant to one activity. A mission system could contain information spanning numerous satellites, sensors, or operations. A maintenance or engineering system may reveal technical details about an entire capability. This creates an important principle: Protecting the satellite without protecting the data in its supporting ground architecture does not protect the mission. The security boundary must encompass the broader space mission ecosystem.
Most cybersecurity discussions focus on preventing an attacker from remotely gaining access to a computer or network. Distributed and deployable systems create another scenario: The adversary may physically possess the computer. Imagine a deployable Space Force endpoint or supporting mission system falls into hostile hands. The adversary may now possess its storage, firmware, processor, operating system, and other components. They can remove SSDs, disassemble equipment, connect components to forensic tools, obtain identical hardware for experimentation, and potentially spend months searching for weaknesses. A sophisticated nation-state may bring together intelligence analysts, hardware engineers, firmware specialists, reverse engineers, and cryptographers. The question changes from: “Can they penetrate our network?” to: “With our equipment sitting on their laboratory bench, can they recover what’s stored inside it?” That is a DAR problem.
Commercial encryption can provide excellent protection for enterprise information. Classified National Security Systems face a different threat model. A common misconception is that a device is adequately protected because it uses AES-256, commercial full-disk encryption, or a “FIPS-certified” drive. Those can be important security attributes. They don’t, by themselves, constitute a classified DAR architecture. A sophisticated adversary doesn’t necessarily need to mathematically break AES. They can search for another path: Where are the encryption keys stored? What causes the storage to unlock? Does it automatically unlock during startup? How is the operator authenticated? Can authentication be bypassed? Can firmware or the boot environment be manipulated? Does compromising one component expose all stored information? The important question isn’t simply: “How strong is the encryption?” It is: “What must an adversary defeat before the classified data becomes accessible?”
FIPS cryptographic validation provides important assurance that specified cryptographic functionality has been tested against defined requirements. But a device containing FIPS-validated cryptography isn’t automatically a complete solution for protecting classified DAR. Think of protecting a launch facility. Installing an extremely strong lock on one door is valuable. But the strength of that lock doesn’t secure the facility if another access point remains unprotected. Security comes from the complete architecture, multiple barriers, authentication, access controls, procedures, and how those protections work together. DAR is similar. Strong cryptography is a critical component. It isn’t the entire security architecture. For classified National Security Systems, NSA provides important direction on how those protections should be constructed.
National Security Presidential Memorandum 12 (NSPM-12), National Policy for the Cybersecurity of National Security Systems, issued in June 2026, establishes cybersecurity governance for NSS and reinforces accountability for protecting systems supporting military, intelligence, and other national-security missions. Importantly, NSPM-12 reestablishes the Director of the National Security Agency as the National Manager for National Security Systems, including responsibilities associated with minimum requirements for cryptology and cryptographic systems. For Space Force organizations developing, acquiring, and operating NSS, the implication is important: Protecting classified information isn’t simply a matter of selecting a commercially available encryption product or encrypted SSD. NSA has a defined national role in establishing how cryptographic protections for NSS are implemented. One important mechanism for accomplishing that mission is the Commercial Solutions for Classified program.
NSA’s Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program enables appropriately evaluated commercial technologies to be used within NSA-defined architectures to protect classified information. For stored information, NSA’s Data-at-Rest Capability Package defines architectures for DAR protection. CSfC changes the question from: “Is this device encrypted?” to: “Does the complete solution provide the layers of protection required for classified information?” Several concepts are particularly relevant to Space Force systems. Layered Protection CSfC DAR uses defense in depth instead of placing all trust in one encryption mechanism. If an adversary compromises one independent layer, another protection layer is intended to remain between the attacker and the classified information. Evaluated Components CSfC architectures use commercial products evaluated for specific security functions and selected according to applicable NSA requirements. A vendor saying its product uses “military-grade encryption” isn’t equivalent to that product being evaluated for a defined role within a classified DAR architecture. Encryption Plus Authentication Strong encryption is useful only if unauthorized users cannot cause the storage to unlock. Think of encrypted storage as a secure mission facility. Encryption provides the hardened structure. Authentication controls access through the door. The strongest facility provides little protection if the door automatically opens whenever someone powers up the system. Both protections matter. Protection of Cryptographic Keys Encryption keys are critical assets. A sophisticated adversary may have little reason to attack AES directly if they can instead obtain or exploit the mechanism protecting its keys. DAR architecture therefore considers key generation, storage, protection, and authorization, not simply the encryption algorithm. Protection That Travels With the Endpoint This is especially important for distributed and deployable space operations. A compromised endpoint may be disconnected from every trusted network. Remote wipe may be impossible. Enterprise security services may be unavailable. The security protecting its data therefore needs to remain effective on the endpoint itself. Physical possession of the equipment should not equal possession of its classified information.
The Space Force appropriately places enormous emphasis on resilience. Architectures are increasingly designed to withstand attacks, degraded communications, failures, and the loss of individual capabilities. As data and computing become increasingly central to those architectures, information survivability must be part of that resilience. Programs developing and acquiring NSS should ask: What classified information will this system retain? Where is that information physically stored? What happens if a ground endpoint falls into unauthorized hands? What sensitive information persists onboard platforms? Can storage be removed and exploited separately? What protects cryptographic keys? Does access require meaningful authentication? If one protection mechanism is compromised, does another independent layer remain? And for classified information: Does the system implement the appropriate NSA-approved DAR architecture for the information it carries? These should be architecture and acquisition questions, not questions first asked after systems are deployed.
Distributed ground architectures, edge computing, artificial intelligence, deployable systems, advanced sensors, and increasingly contested space operations are putting more valuable information outside traditional physical-security boundaries. That creates a straightforward operational reality: If we cannot guarantee possession or control of the device, we must ensure that possession of the device does not provide possession of its data. Commercial encryption and FIPS-validated cryptography can be important components. For classified information, however, simply checking an encryption box isn’t enough. NSPM-12 reinforces NSA’s central role in protecting National Security Systems, while NSA’s CSfC DAR program provides architectures for combining evaluated commercial technologies into layered protections for classified information. For the Space Force, DAR shouldn’t be viewed simply as an IT or cybersecurity requirement. It is information survivability, and an essential component of space mission resilience. The Space Force cannot eliminate every possibility that a distributed endpoint, ground system, or other mission component will be compromised or fall outside U.S. control. It can, and should, design systems so that losing control of the hardware does not mean losing control of the classified information inside it.
Brett Hansen, Cigent CEO, has 30 years of IT experience. Prior to joining Cigent, held leadership positions with companies providing SaaS data solutions. He was also an executive at Dell for over a decade overseeing Client Software organization including developing and leading Dell Data Security business that provided integrated hardware and software security solutions. Brett started his career with IBM holding leadership positions with various software organizations focusing on IT management, development, and security.
